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Abstract	  
	  
“Partyism”	  is	  a	  form	  of	  hostility	  and	  prejudice	  that	  operates	  across	  political	  
lines.	  For	  example,	  some	  Republicans	  have	  an	  immediate	  aversive	  reaction	  to	  
Democrats,	  and	  some	  Democrats	  have	  the	  same	  aversive	  reaction	  to	  
Republicans,	  so	  much	  so	  that	  they	  would	  discriminate	  against	  them	  in	  hiring	  or	  
promotion	  decisions,	  or	  in	  imposing	  punishment.	  If	  elected	  officials	  suffer	  from	  
partyism	  –	  perhaps	  because	  their	  constituents	  do	  -­‐-­‐	  they	  will	  devalue	  proposals	  
from	  the	  opposing	  party	  and	  refuse	  to	  enter	  into	  agreements	  with	  its	  members,	  
even	  if	  their	  independent	  assessment,	  freed	  from	  partyism,	  would	  be	  favorably	  
disposed	  toward	  those	  proposals	  or	  agreements.	  In	  the	  United	  States,	  partyism	  
has	  been	  rapidly	  growing,	  and	  it	  is	  quite	  pronounced–	  in	  some	  ways,	  more	  so	  
than	  racism.	  It	  also	  has	  a	  series	  of	  adverse	  effects	  on	  governance	  itself,	  above	  all	  
by	  making	  it	  difficult	  to	  enact	  desirable	  legislation	  and	  thus	  disrupting	  the	  
system	  of	  separation	  of	  powers.	  Under	  circumstances	  of	  severe	  partyism,	  
relatively	  broad	  delegations	  of	  authority	  to	  the	  executive	  branch,	  and	  a	  suitably	  
receptive	  approach	  to	  the	  Chevron	  principle,	  have	  considerable	  appeal	  as	  ways	  
of	  allowing	  significant	  social	  problems	  to	  be	  addressed.	  This	  conclusion	  bears	  
on	  both	  domestic	  issues	  and	  foreign	  affairs.	  	  	  
I.	  The	  Goal	  	   With	  respect	  to	  prejudice	  and	  hostility,	  the	  English	  language	  has	  a	  number	  of	  “isms.”	  Racism,	  sexism,	  classism,	  and	  speciesism	  are	  prominent	  examples.	  I	  aim	  to	  coin	  a	  new	  one	  here:	  partyism.	  The	  central	  idea	  is	  that	  merely	  by	  identifying	  with	  a	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political	  party,	  a	  person	  becomes	  hostile	  to	  the	  opposing	  party	  and	  willing	  to	  believe	  that	  its	  members	  have	  a	  host	  of	  bad	  characteristics.1	  	  My	  major	  suggestion	  here	  is	  that	  partyism	  is	  real	  and	  on	  the	  rise,	  and	  that	  it	  has	  serious	  adverse	  consequences	  for	  governance,	  politics,	  and	  daily	  life.	  In	  some	  ways,	  partyism	  is	  now	  worse	  than	  racism.	  I	  also	  offer	  a	  few	  words	  about	  its	  causes	  and	  consequences	  and	  make	  some	  suggestions	  about	  what	  might	  be	  done	  about	  it.	  Under	  conditions	  of	  severe	  partyism,	  it	  becomes	  unusually	  difficult	  to	  address	  serious	  social	  problems,	  at	  least	  through	  legislation.	  To	  that	  extent,	  the	  system	  of	  separation	  of	  powers	  –	  which	  already	  imposes	  a	  series	  of	  barriers	  to	  legislative	  initiatives	  –	  become	  genuinely	  unsettled.	  	  My	  principal	  proposal	  involves	  the	  importance	  and	  the	  value	  of	  grants	  of	  discretionary	  authority	  to	  the	  executive	  branch.	  I	  shall	  argue	  that	  amidst	  high	  levels	  of	  partyism,	  such	  grants	  can	  be	  highly	  desirable,	  at	  least	  if	  it	  is	  agreed	  that	  serious	  social	  problems	  need	  to	  be	  addressed.	  This	  conclusion	  has	  implications	  for	  judicial	  treatment	  of	  executive	  action,	  especially	  in	  areas	  of	  law	  in	  which	  the	  executive	  is	  interpreting	  vague	  or	  ambiguous	  statutory	  terms.	  Those	  who	  object	  to	  executive	  discretion,	  and	  to	  accompanying	  judicial	  doctrines,	  have	  things	  exactly	  backwards,	  at	  least	  under	  conditions	  of	  severe	  and	  persistent	  partyism.	  	  	  
II.	  Evidence	  
	  There	  is	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  evidence	  of	  partyism	  and	  its	  growth.	  Perhaps	  the	  simplest	  involves	  “thermometer	  ratings.”2	  With	  those	  ratings,	  people	  are	  asked	  to	  rate	  a	  range	  of	  groups	  on	  a	  scale	  of	  1	  to	  100,	  where	  100	  means	  that	  the	  respondent	  feels	  “warm”	  toward	  the	  group	  and	  0	  means	  that	  the	  respondent	  feels	  “cold.”	  In-­‐party	  rankings	  have	  remained	  stable	  over	  the	  last	  three	  decades,	  with	  both	  Democrats	  and	  Republicans	  ranking	  members	  of	  their	  own	  party	  around	  70.	  By	  contrast,	  ratings	  of	  the	  out-­‐party	  has	  experienced	  a	  remarkable	  fifteen-­‐point	  dip	  since	  1988.3	  In	  2008,	  the	  average	  out-­‐party	  ranking	  was	  around	  30	  –	  and	  apparently	  declining.	  	   By	  contrast,	  Republicans	  ranked	  “people	  on	  welfare,”	  in	  that	  year,	  at	  50,	  and	  Democrats	  ranked	  “Big	  Business”	  at	  52.	  It	  is	  remarkable	  but	  true	  that	  negative	  affect	  toward	  the	  opposing	  party	  is	  not	  merely	  greater	  than	  negative	  affect	  toward	  unwelcome	  people	  and	  causes;	  it	  is	  much	  greater.	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  Shanto	  Iyengar,	  Guarav	  Sood	  &	  Yphtach	  Lelkes,	  Affect,	  Not	  Ideology:	  A	  Social	  
Identity	  Perspective	  on	  Polarization,	  76	  PUB.	  OPIN.	  Q.	  405	  (2012),	  available	  at	  http://pcl.stanford.edu/research/2012/iyengar-­‐poq-­‐affect-­‐not-­‐ideology.pdf.	  2	  See	  Shanto	  Iyengar	  et	  al.,	  Affect,	  Not	  Ideology:	  A	  Social	  Identity	  Perspective	  on	  Affective	  Polarization,	  76	  Public	  Opinion	  Quarterly	  405	  (2012).	  3	  Id.	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  Consider	  one	  of	  the	  most	  influential	  measures	  of	  prejudice:	  the	  implicit-­‐association	  test.4	  The	  test	  is	  simple	  to	  take.	  Participants	  see	  words	  on	  the	  upper	  corners	  of	  a	  screen	  -­‐-­‐	  for	  example,	  "white"	  paired	  with	  either	  "good"	  or	  "bad"	  in	  the	  upper	  left	  corner,	  and	  "black"	  paired	  with	  one	  of	  those	  same	  adjectives	  in	  the	  upper	  right.	  Then	  they	  see	  a	  picture	  or	  a	  word	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  screen	  -­‐-­‐	  for	  example,	  a	  white	  face,	  an	  African-­‐American	  face,	  or	  the	  word	  "joy"	  or	  "terrible."	  The	  task	  is	  to	  click	  on	  the	  upper	  corner	  that	  matches	  either	  the	  picture	  or	  the	  word	  in	  the	  middle.	  	   Many	  white	  people	  quickly	  associate	  positive	  words	  like	  "joy,"	  or	  an	  evidently	  European	  American	  (Caucasian)	  face,	  with	  the	  upper	  left	  corner	  when	  it	  says	  "white"	  and	  "good"	  -­‐-­‐	  but	  have	  a	  much	  harder	  time	  associating	  "joy"	  with	  the	  left	  corner	  when	  the	  words	  there	  are	  "black"	  and	  "good."5	  So	  too,	  many	  white	  people	  quickly	  associate	  "terrible"	  with	  the	  left	  corner	  when	  it	  says	  "black"	  and	  "bad,"	  but	  proceed	  a	  lot	  more	  slowly	  when	  the	  left	  corner	  says	  "white"	  and	  "bad."6	  And	  when	  the	  picture	  in	  the	  middle	  is	  evidently	  of	  a	  European	  American	  (Caucasian),	  white	  people	  are	  a	  lot	  faster	  in	  associating	  it	  with	  the	  word	  “good”	  than	  when	  the	  picture	  is	  evidently	  of	  an	  African-­‐American.7	  	  It	  is	  tempting	  to	  think	  that	  racial	  prejudice	  is	  deeply	  engrained	  and	  that	  nothing	  comparable	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  political	  domain,	  at	  least	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  two	  major	  parties	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  (To	  be	  sure,	  we	  might	  expect	  to	  see	  strongly	  negative	  implicit	  attitudes	  for	  “Nazis”	  or	  “Communists.”)	  To	  test	  for	  political	  prejudice,	  Shanto	  Iyengar	  and	  Sean	  Westwood,	  political	  scientists	  at	  Stanford	  University,	  conducted	  a	  large-­‐scale	  implicit	  association	  test	  with	  2,000	  adults.8	  They	  found	  people’s	  political	  bias	  to	  be	  much	  larger	  than	  their	  racial	  bias.	  When	  Democrats	  see	  "joy,"	  it	  is	  much	  easier	  for	  them	  to	  click	  on	  a	  corner	  that	  says	  "Democratic"	  and	  "good"	  than	  on	  one	  that	  says	  "Republican"	  and	  "good."	  Implicit	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  See,	  e.g.,	  Anthony	  Greenwald,	  Debbie	  E.	  McGhee	  &	  Jordan	  L.	  K.	  Schwartz,	  Measuring	  
Individual	  Differences	  in	  Implicit	  Cognition:	  The	  Implicit	  Association	  Test,	  74	  J.	  OF	  PERSONALITY	  &	  SOC.	  PSYCH.	  1464	  (1998);	  N.	  Sriram	  &	  Anthony	  G.	  Greenwald,	  The	  Brief	  
Implicit	  Association	  Test,	  56	  EXPERIMENTAL	  PSYCH.	  283,	  283	  	  (2009)	  (“In	  eleven	  years	  since	  its	  introduction,	  the	  Implicit	  Association	  Test	  	  .	  .	  .	  has	  been	  used	  in	  several	  hundred	  studies	  to	  provide	  measures	  of	  association	  strengths.”).	  	  5	  E.g.,	  Greenwald,	  McGhee	  &	  Schwartz,	  supra	  note,	  at	  1474;	  Scott	  A.	  Ottaway,	  Davis	  C.	  Hayden	  &	  Mark	  A.	  Oakes,	  Implicit	  Attitudes	  and	  Racism:	  Effects	  of	  Word	  Familiarity	  and	  Frequency	  on	  the	  Implicit	  Association	  Test,	  19	  SOC.	  COGNITION	  97,	  130	  (2001);	  Shanto	  Iyengar	  &	  Sean	  J.	  Westwood,	  Fear	  and	  Loathing	  Across	  Party	  Lines:	  New	  
Evidence	  on	  Group	  Polarization,	  Working	  Paper	  12	  (2014).	  6	  See	  sources	  cited	  in	  note	  supra.	  7	  This	  is	  a	  slight	  simplification	  of	  how	  the	  test	  works.	  See	  sources	  cited	  in	  note	  supra.	  8	  Iyengar	  &	  Westwood,	  supra	  note,	  at	  9.	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bias	  across	  racial	  lines	  remains	  significant,	  but	  it	  is	  significantly	  greater	  across	  political	  lines.	  9	  
	  
B. Love	  and	  Marriage	  	  If	  you	  are	  a	  Democrat,	  would	  you	  marry	  a	  Republican?	  Would	  you	  be	  upset	  if	  your	  sister	  did?	  Researchers	  have	  long	  asked	  such	  questions	  about	  race,	  and	  have	  found	  that	  along	  important	  dimensions,	  racial	  prejudice	  is	  decreasing.10	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  party	  prejudice	  in	  the	  U.S.	  has	  jumped,	  infecting	  not	  only	  politics	  but	  also	  decisions	  about	  marriage.	  In	  1960,	  just	  5	  percent	  of	  Republicans	  and	  4	  percent	  of	  Democrats	  said	  that	  they	  would	  feel	  “displeased”	  if	  their	  son	  or	  daughter	  married	  outside	  their	  political	  party.11	  By	  2010,	  those	  numbers	  had	  reached	  49	  percent	  and	  33	  percent.12	  Interestingly,	  comparable	  increases	  cannot	  be	  found	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom.13	  	  In	  2009,	  by	  contrast,	  6	  percent	  of	  Americans	  reported	  that	  they	  “would	  be	  fine”	  if	  a	  member	  of	  their	  family	  married	  someone	  of	  any	  other	  race	  or	  ethnicity,	  a	  sharp	  change	  from	  as	  recently	  as	  1986,	  when	  65	  percent	  of	  respondents	  said	  that	  interracial	  marriage	  was	  not	  fine	  for	  anyone	  or	  not	  fine	  for	  them.14	  Asked	  specifically	  about	  marriages	  between	  African-­‐American	  and	  white	  partners,	  only	  6	  percent	  of	  white	  respondents	  and	  3	  percent	  of	  African-­‐Americans	  recently	  said	  that	  “they	  could	  not	  accept	  a	  black-­‐white	  interracial	  marriage	  in	  their	  family.”15	  Similarly,	  a	  recent	  Gallup	  survey	  found	  that	  87	  percent	  of	  people	  approve	  of	  interracial	  marriage,	  while	  4	  percent	  did	  in	  1958	  –	  a	  dramatic	  shift	  in	  social	  norms,	  showing	  the	  opposite	  trend-­‐line	  from	  that	  observed	  for	  partyism.16	  	  
C. 	  Hiring	  
	  The	  IAT	  measures	  attitudes,	  not	  behavior.	  Growing	  disapproval	  of	  marriage	  across	  political	  lines	  suggests	  an	  increase	  in	  prejudice	  and	  hostility,	  but	  it	  might	  not	  map	  onto	  actual	  conduct.	  To	  investigate	  behavior,	  Iyengar	  and	  Westwood	  asked	  more	  than	  1,000	  people	  to	  look	  at	  the	  resumes	  of	  several	  high-­‐school	  seniors	  and	  say	  which	  ones	  should	  be	  awarded	  a	  scholarship.17	  Some	  of	  these	  resumes	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Id.	  at	  12.	  10	  See	  Iyengar	  et	  al.,	  supra	  note,	  at	  416	  (showing	  a	  steady	  decrease	  in	  racial	  polarization	  from	  1964	  to	  2008).	  11	  Iyengar	  et	  al.,	  supra	  note,	  at	  415-­‐18.	  12	  Id.	  13	  Id.	  14	  PAUL	  TAYLOR	  ET	  AL.,	  PEW	  SOCIAL	  &	  DEMOGRAPHIC	  TRENDS,	  THE	  RISE	  OF	  INTERMARRIAGE	  7	  (2012),	  available	  at	  http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2012/02/SDT-­‐Intermarriage-­‐II.pdf.	  15	  Id.	  at	  36.	  16	  http://www.gallup.com/poll/163697/approve-­‐marriage-­‐blacks-­‐whites.aspx.	  17	  Iyengar	  &	  Westwood,	  supra	  note,	  at	  14.	  
	   5	  
contained	  explicitly	  racial	  cues	  (“president	  of	  the	  African	  American	  Student	  Association”)	  while	  others	  had	  explicitly	  political	  ones	  (“president	  of	  the	  Young	  Republicans”).18	  	   In	  terms	  of	  ultimate	  judgments,	  race	  certainly	  mattered:	  African-­‐American	  participants	  preferred	  the	  African-­‐American	  scholarship	  candidates	  73	  percent	  to	  27	  percent.19	  For	  their	  part,	  whites	  showed	  a	  modest	  preference	  for	  African-­‐American	  candidates	  as	  well,	  though	  by	  a	  significantly	  smaller	  margin.20	  But	  party	  affiliation	  made	  a	  much	  larger	  difference.	  Both	  Democrats	  and	  Republicans	  selected	  their	  in-­‐party	  candidate	  about	  80	  percent	  of	  the	  time.21	  Even	  when	  a	  candidate	  from	  the	  opposing	  party	  had	  better	  credentials,	  most	  people	  chose	  the	  candidate	  from	  their	  own	  party.22	  With	  respect	  to	  race,	  in	  contrast,	  merit	  prevailed.23	  It	  is	  worth	  underlining	  this	  finding:	  Racial	  preferences	  were	  eliminated	  when	  one	  candidate	  was	  
clearly	  better	  than	  the	  other.	  By	  contrast,	  party	  preferences	  lead	  people	  to	  choose	  a	  
clearly	  inferior	  candidate.	  
	  
	   A	  similar	  study	  asked	  students	  to	  play	  the	  role	  of	  college	  admissions	  director	  and	  to	  decide	  which	  applicants	  to	  invite	  for	  an	  on-­‐campus	  interview,	  based	  on	  both	  objective	  criteria	  (SAT	  scores,	  class	  rank)	  and	  subjective	  evidence	  (teacher	  recommendations).24	  Among	  partisans	  with	  strong	  party	  identification,	  there	  was	  significant	  evidence	  of	  partyism:	  44	  percent	  of	  the	  participants	  reviewing	  someone	  from	  the	  opposite	  party	  selected	  the	  stronger	  applicant,	  while	  79	  percent	  of	  the	  participants	  in	  the	  control	  (where	  participants	  had	  no	  knowledge	  of	  the	  applicant’s	  party	  affiliation)	  selected	  the	  stronger	  applicant.25	  	  	  
	  
D.	  Trust	  	  In	  a	  further	  test	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  partyism	  and	  actual	  behavior,	  Iyengar	  and	  Westwood	  asked	  800	  people	  to	  play	  “the	  trust	  game,”26	  well	  known	  among	  behavioral	  scientists.27	  As	  the	  game	  is	  played,	  Player	  1	  is	  given	  some	  money	  (say,	  $10)	  and	  told	  that	  she	  can	  give	  some,	  all	  or	  none	  of	  it	  to	  Player	  2.	  Player	  1	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Id.	  19	  Id.	  at	  16.	  20	  Id.	  21	  Id.	  at	  15-­‐16.	  22	  Id.	  at	  16-­‐17.	  23	  Id.	  at	  18.	  24	  Geoffrey	  D.	  Munro,	  Terell	  P.	  Lasane	  &	  Scott	  P.	  Leary,	  Political	  Partisan	  Prejudice:	  
Selective	  Distortion	  and	  Weighting	  of	  Evaluative	  Categories	  in	  College	  Admissions	  
Applications,	  40	  J.	  Applied	  Soc.	  Psych.	  2434,	  2440	  (2010).	  25	  Id.	  at	  2444-­‐45.	  26	  Iyengar	  &	  Westwood,	  supra	  note,	  at	  20.	  27	  Daniel	  Kahneman,	  Jack	  L.	  Knetsch	  &	  Richard	  H.	  Thaler,	  Fairness	  and	  the	  
Assumptions	  of	  Economics,	  59	  J.	  OF	  BUS.	  S285	  (1986).	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then	  told	  that	  the	  researcher	  will	  triple	  the	  amount	  that	  she	  allocates	  to	  Player	  2	  -­‐-­‐	  and	  that	  Player	  2	  can	  give	  some	  of	  that	  back	  to	  Player	  1.	  When	  Player	  1	  decides	  how	  much	  money	  to	  give	  Player	  2,	  a	  central	  question	  is	  how	  well	  she	  trusts	  him	  to	  return	  an	  equivalent	  or	  greater	  amount.	  Higher	  levels	  of	  trust	  will	  result	  in	  higher	  initial	  allocations.	  	  	   Are	  people	  less	  willing	  to	  trust	  people	  of	  a	  different	  race	  or	  party	  affiliation?	  Iyengar	  and	  Westwood	  found	  that	  race	  did	  not	  matter	  -­‐-­‐	  but	  party	  did.	  People	  are	  significantly	  more	  trusting	  of	  others	  who	  share	  their	  party	  affiliation.28	  	  
E. Other	  Evidence	  	  Partyism	  can	  motivate	  partisans	  to	  be	  especially	  inclined	  to	  share	  negative	  information	  about	  the	  opposing	  party	  -­‐-­‐	  or	  even	  to	  avoid	  its	  members	  altogether	  when	  forming	  a	  group.29	  In	  one	  experiment,	  participants	  were	  asking	  to	  decide	  whether	  a	  strongly	  worded	  opinion	  piece	  blaming	  congressional	  gridlock	  on	  one	  of	  the	  two	  political	  parties,	  including	  hyperbole	  and	  name	  calling,	  should	  be	  posted	  on	  a	  news	  organization’s	  website.30	  The	  researchers	  found	  significant	  evidence	  of	  partyism:	  65	  percentage	  of	  people	  were	  willing	  to	  post	  the	  article	  if	  it	  was	  critical	  of	  the	  opposing	  party,	  but	  only	  25	  percent	  were	  willing	  to	  share	  it	  if	  it	  criticized	  its	  own	  party.31	  They	  also	  found	  that	  the	  intensity	  of	  a	  participant’s	  partisan	  feelings	  correlated	  with	  their	  willingness	  to	  share	  a	  critical	  article.32	  	  In	  a	  second	  experiment,	  the	  researchers	  asked	  participants	  to	  pick	  a	  team	  of	  three	  people	  out	  of	  a	  list	  of	  four	  to	  join	  them	  in	  completing	  in	  puzzle	  game.33	  Participants	  were	  informed	  of	  the	  partisan	  identity	  and	  education	  level	  of	  the	  potential	  teammates;	  the	  least	  educated	  team	  member	  was	  always	  an	  independent.	  More	  than	  half	  the	  participants	  selected	  the	  least	  educated	  player	  for	  their	  team	  -­‐-­‐	  rather	  than	  choosing	  a	  better-­‐educated	  member	  of	  the	  opposing	  party34!	  	  	  
F.	  An	  Objection	  	   From	  these	  studies,	  and	  various	  others,35	  it	  seems	  clear	  that	  partyism	  is	  widespread	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  We	  can	  imagine	  reasonable	  disputes	  about	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Iyengar	  &	  Westwood,	  supra	  note,	  at	  21-­‐23.	  29	  Yphtach	  Lelkes	  &	  Sean	  J.	  Westwood,	  The	  Nature	  and	  Limits	  of	  Partisan	  Prejudice,	  Working	  Paper	  2014.	  30	  Id.	  at	  9.	  31	  Id.	  at	  10.	  32	  Id.	  at	  11.	  33	  Id.	  at	  14.	  34	  Note,	  however,	  that	  there	  are	  significant	  qualifications	  to	  this	  finding,	  with	  some	  reluctance	  to	  discriminate	  along	  party	  lines.	  Id.	  35	  See	  Lilliana	  Mason,	  “I	  Disrespectfully	  Agree”:	  The	  Differential	  Effects	  of	  Partisan	  
Sorting	  on	  Social	  and	  Issue	  Polarization,	  AM.	  J.	  OF	  POLI.	  SCI.	  (forthcoming	  2014);	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precise	  magnitude	  of	  the	  phenomenon,	  but	  not	  of	  its	  existence	  and	  significance.	  But	  there	  is	  an	  obvious	  objection	  to	  the	  effort	  to	  compare	  racism	  to	  partyism,	  and	  indeed	  to	  the	  very	  effort	  to	  describe	  partyism	  as	  seriously	  troubling.	  The	  objection	  is	  that	  people	  have	  legitimate	  reasons	  for	  objecting	  to	  people	  because	  of	  their	  political	  beliefs.	  If	  we	  think	  that	  Communism	  is	  hateful,	  we	  will	  not	  object	  to	  those	  who	  do	  not	  much	  like	  Communists.	  “Red-­‐baiting”	  is	  not	  exactly	  admirable,	  but	  it	  would	  not	  be	  helpful	  to	  identify	  and	  to	  object	  to	  “Communismism.”	  	  	  For	  some	  people,	  a	  degree	  of	  suspicion	  and	  hostility	  across	  political	  lines	  is	  a	  product	  of	  legitimate	  disagreement,	  not	  of	  anything	  untoward.	  Racism	  and	  sexism	  are	  a	  product	  of	  devaluation	  of	  human	  beings	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  an	  immutable	  or	  at	  least	  irrelevant	  characteristic.	  Perhaps	  the	  same	  cannot	  be	  said	  for	  party	  affiliation.	  In	  fact	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  political	  prejudice,	  or	  any	  kind	  of	  corresponding	  “ism,”	  might	  seem	  badly	  misdirected.	  Perhaps	  we	  are	  speaking	  here	  not	  of	  any	  kind	  of	  prejudice,	  but	  of	  a	  considered	  judgment	  about	  people	  who	  hold	  certain	  convictions.	  On	  certain	  assumptions,	  that	  is	  the	  precise	  opposite	  of	  prejudice.	  	  To	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  this	  response,	  we	  need	  to	  begin	  by	  distinguishing	  between	  daily	  life	  and	  politics	  as	  such.	  It	  is	  hardly	  unreasonable	  to	  have	  a	  strong	  negative	  affect	  toward	  Nazis	  or	  Communists	  because	  of	  their	  political	  views.	  But	  if	  people	  dislike	  each	  other	  because	  an	  affiliation	  with	  one	  of	  the	  major	  parties	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  something	  does	  seem	  badly	  amiss.	  To	  be	  sure,	  some	  characteristics	  or	  even	  commitments	  of	  one	  or	  another	  party	  might	  seem	  troublesome	  or	  worse.	  But	  both	  parties	  are	  large	  and	  diverse,	  and	  it	  is	  odd	  to	  think	  that	  outside	  of	  the	  political	  domain,	  members	  of	  one	  party	  should	  actually	  dislike	  members	  of	  another	  party	  as	  such.	  Of	  course	  this	  judgment	  turns	  on	  substantive	  conclusions.	  If	  you	  believe	  that	  Republicans	  are	  essentially	  racists	  and	  sexists,	  antipathy	  toward	  Republicans	  is	  understandable,	  and	  so	  too	  if	  you	  believe	  that	  Democrats	  are	  unpatriotic	  socialists	  who	  seek	  to	  undermine	  the	  United	  States.	  But	  if	  you	  believe	  that	  across	  the	  two	  parties,	  good-­‐faith	  disagreements	  are	  possible	  and	  pervasive,	  partyism	  will	  be	  hard	  to	  defend,	  not	  least	  if	  it	  seeps	  into	  daily	  life.	  	  In	  the	  political	  domain,	  of	  course,	  intensely	  held	  differences	  are	  common,	  and	  some	  kind	  of	  “we-­‐they”	  attitude	  may	  be	  difficult	  or	  impossible	  to	  avoid.	  For	  members	  of	  Congress,	  such	  an	  attitude	  is,	  in	  a	  sense,	  built	  into	  the	  very	  structure	  of	  the	  two-­‐party	  system.	  A	  degree	  of	  antipathy	  –	  at	  least	  if	  it	  is	  not	  personal	  -­‐-­‐	  may	  reflect	  principled	  disagreement,	  not	  prejudice	  at	  all.	  It	  may	  be	  hard	  to	  avoid	  a	  measure	  of	  antipathy	  with	  respect	  to	  people	  with	  whom	  you	  intensely	  disagree,	  most	  of	  the	  time,	  in	  your	  day	  job.	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  good	  faith	  disagreement	  is	  far	  from	  uncommon	  in	  politics,	  and	  in	  the	  face	  of	  such	  disagreement,	  the	  task	  is	  to	  seek	  to	  identify	  ways	  to	  move	  forward	  (or	  not),	  rather	  than	  to	  discredit	  arguments	  because	  of	  their	  source.	  With	  respect	  to	  politics	  itself,	  something	  like	  partyism	  may	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Adrian	  Furnham,	  Factors	  Relating	  to	  the	  Allocation	  of	  Medical	  Resources,	  11	  J.	  SOC.	  BEHAV.	  &	  PERSONALITY	  615,	  620	  (1996).	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be	  a	  product	  of	  principle,	  but	  it	  also	  has	  destructive	  consequences,	  as	  we	  shall	  shortly	  see.	  	  
G.	  Causes	  
	  What	  causes	  partyism?	  We	  do	  not	  yet	  know	  the	  answer,	  but	  some	  helpful	  clues	  have	  started	  to	  emerge.	  	  1.	  From	  ideological	  disagreement	  to	  partyism?	  It	  is	  tempting	  to	  think	  that	  the	  growth	  in	  partyism	  is	  a	  product	  of	  the	  increasing	  intensity	  and	  visibility	  of	  ideological	  disagreements.	  Let	  us	  assume	  that	  at	  some	  point	  in	  the	  past	  –	  say,	  1970	  –	  one	  or	  another	  of	  the	  two	  parties,	  or	  perhaps	  both,	  had	  a	  “wider	  tent.”	  Let	  us	  assume,	  in	  fact,	  that	  the	  conservative	  wing	  of	  the	  Democratic	  Party	  was	  more	  conservative	  than	  the	  liberal	  wing	  of	  the	  Republican	  Party,	  so	  that	  the	  two	  parties	  had	  significant	  ideological	  overlap.	  If	  so,	  we	  would	  not	  expect	  to	  see	  much	  in	  the	  way	  of	  partyism.	  	  	   This	  hypothesis	  could	  be	  tested	  in	  multiple	  ways.	  We	  could	  attempt	  to	  track	  ideological	  differences	  between	  the	  parties	  and	  test	  whether	  growth	  in	  ideological	  distance	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  correlated	  with	  increases	  in	  partyism.	  A	  strong	  correlation	  would	  not	  be	  definitive,	  but	  it	  would	  be	  at	  least	  suggestive.	  It	  would	  indicate	  that	  strong	  negative	  affect,	  across	  political	  lines,	  would	  have	  something	  to	  do	  with	  increasingly	  intense	  substantive	  disagreements.	  And	  if	  this	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  so,	  the	  rise	  of	  partyism	  would,	  in	  a	  sense,	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  rational,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  prejudice	  and	  antipathy	  would	  be	  a	  product	  of	  something	  concrete	  and	  real.	  The	  role	  of	  partyism	  in	  the	  private	  domain	  would	  remain	  hard	  to	  defend,	  but	  in	  politics,	  at	  least,	  its	  recent	  increase	  would	  be	  comprehensible.	  	   But	  a	  better	  way	  to	  test	  the	  hypothesis	  would	  be	  to	  see	  whether	  the	  intensity	  of	  people’s	  policy	  preferences	  predicts	  partyism.	  In	  other	  words:	  When	  people	  have	  very	  strong	  views	  about	  political	  issues,	  and	  when	  those	  very	  strong	  views	  suggest	  clear	  divisions	  across	  party	  lines,	  are	  they	  more	  likely	  to	  show	  a	  negative	  affect	  toward	  the	  opposing	  party?	  Surprisingly,	  the	  connection	  between	  ideological	  
polarization	  and	  negative	  affect	  is	  relatively	  weak.36	  It	  appears	  that	  people’s	  partisan	  attachments	  are	  a	  product	  of	  their	  identity	  rather	  than	  their	  ideology.	  When	  Republicans	  dislike	  Democrats,	  or	  vice	  versa,	  it	  is	  largely	  because	  they	  are	  on	  the	  opposing	  side;	  substantive	  disagreements	  matter,	  to	  be	  sure,	  but	  they	  are	  not	  primary.	  	  	   2.	  Campaigns.	  Do	  political	  campaigns	  create	  partyism?	  It	  is	  natural	  to	  suspect	  that	  they	  do,	  first	  because	  they	  make	  party	  differences	  salient,	  and	  second	  because	  part	  of	  the	  point	  is	  to	  cast	  the	  opposing	  side	  in	  a	  negative	  light.	  Iyengar	  and	  Westwood	  find	  support	  for	  this	  hypothesis.	  In	  particular,	  exposure	  to	  negative	  advertising	  contributes	  to	  a	  growth	  in	  partisan	  animus,	  and	  political	  campaigns	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  See	  Iyengar	  et	  al.,	  supra	  note,	  at	  422-­‐23;	  Mason,	  supra	  note,	  at	  14.	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themselves	  have	  that	  effect.37	  Apparently	  campaigns	  serve	  to	  “prime”	  partisan	  identity	  and	  also	  support	  stereotypical	  and	  negative	  perceptions	  of	  both	  supporters	  and	  opponents.	  	  	   3.	  	  Your	  media,	  my	  media.	  In	  a	  fragmented	  media	  market,	  it	  is	  easy	  for	  people	  to	  segregate	  along	  partisan	  lines.	  Fox	  News	  has	  an	  identifiable	  conservative	  orientation;	  MSNBC	  has	  an	  identifiable	  liberal	  orientation.	  Some	  talk	  shows	  are	  easy	  to	  characterize	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  political	  commitments	  of	  the	  host.	  If	  a	  show	  or	  a	  station	  characterizes	  one	  group	  of	  people	  as	  “the	  other	  side,”	  and	  if	  those	  on	  that	  side	  are	  described	  as	  malicious,	  foolish,	  or	  power-­‐hungry,	  then	  viewers	  or	  listeners	  should	  experience	  a	  rise	  in	  partyism.38	  We	  do	  not	  have	  clear	  data	  on	  this	  particular	  speculation,	  but	  some	  is	  emerging,39	  but	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  suspect	  that	  a	  fragmented	  media	  market,	  with	  clear	  political	  identifications,	  contributes	  a	  great	  deal	  to	  partyism.	  	   	  
III.	  Some	  Consequences	  
	  
A. Source	  Devaluation	  and	  Political	  Polarization	  	   Suppose	  that	  a	  society	  is	  divided	  on	  some	  proposition.	  The	  first	  group	  believes	  A	  and	  the	  second	  group	  believes	  not-­‐A.	  Suppose	  that	  the	  first	  group	  is	  correct.	  Suppose	  finally	  that	  truthful	  information	  is	  provided,	  not	  from	  members	  of	  the	  first	  group	  but	  from	  some	  independent	  source,	  in	  support	  of	  A.	  It	  would	  be	  reasonable	  to	  suppose	  that	  the	  second	  group	  would	  come	  to	  believe	  A.	  But	  in	  important	  settings,	  the	  opposite	  happens.	  The	  second	  group	  continues	  to	  believe	  not-­‐A,	  and	  even	  more	  firmly	  than	  before.	  The	  result	  of	  the	  correction	  is	  to	  increase	  polarization.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  See	  Iyengar	  et	  al.,	  supra	  note,	  at	  425-­‐27	  (finding	  that	  residence	  in	  a	  battleground	  state	  during	  an	  election	  year	  correlates	  significantly	  with	  intensity	  of	  partisan	  affect,	  and	  that	  partisan	  affect	  increases	  significantly	  over	  the	  course	  of	  a	  campaign,	  especially	  in	  battleground	  states);	  Guarav	  Sood,	  Shanto	  Iyengar	  &	  Kyle	  Dropp,	  
Coming	  to	  Dislike	  Your	  Opponents:	  The	  Polarizing	  Impact	  of	  Political	  Campaigns,	  Working	  Paper	  April	  2013	  (finding	  that	  over	  the	  course	  of	  a	  campaign,	  partisans	  form	  more	  negative	  views	  of	  the	  opposing	  party,	  and	  the	  most	  strongly	  correlated	  feature	  is	  exposure	  to	  televised	  political	  advertising,	  especially	  negative	  ads).	  38	  For	  relevant	  discussion,	  see	  Cass	  R.	  Sunstein	  Republic.com	  2.0	  (2007).	  39	  See	  Yphtach	  Lelkes,	  Shanto	  Iyengar	  &	  Gaurav	  Sood,	  The	  Hostile	  Audience:	  Selective	  
Exposure	  to	  Partisan	  Sources	  and	  Affective	  Polarization,	  Working	  Paper	  2013	  (finding	  that	  for	  partisans	  who	  pay	  attention	  to	  politics,	  cable	  access	  is	  correlated	  with	  greater	  partisan	  affect	  in	  years	  when	  cable	  carried	  partisan	  content,	  and	  further	  finding	  that	  the	  preference	  of	  partisans	  for	  choosing,	  between	  MSNBC	  and	  Fox	  News,	  the	  news	  sources	  amenable	  to	  their	  party	  “in	  and	  of	  itself	  -­‐-­‐	  is	  sufficient	  to	  predict	  partisan	  animus,	  greater	  affect	  for	  in-­‐party	  elites	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  out-­‐party	  elites,	  greater	  social	  distance	  between	  partisans,	  and	  a	  preference	  for	  attack-­‐oriented	  campaign	  rhetoric.”).	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The	  underlying	  studies	  do	  not	  involve	  party	  differences	  as	  such,	  but	  they	  explore	  something	  very	  close	  to	  that,	  and	  they	  suggest	  the	  following	  proposition:	  An	  important	  consequence	  of	  partyism	  is	  to	  ensure	  that	  people	  with	  a	  strong	  political	  
identification	  will	  be	  relatively	  immune	  from	  corrections,	  even	  on	  matters	  of	  fact,	  from	  
people	  who	  do	  not	  share	  that	  identification.	  Since	  agreement	  on	  matters	  of	  fact	  is	  often	  a	  precondition	  for	  political	  progress,	  this	  phenomenon	  can	  be	  extremely	  destructive.	  	  In	  a	  relevant	  experiment,	  people	  were	  exposed	  to	  a	  mock	  news	  article	  in	  which	  President	  George	  W.	  Bush	  defended	  the	  Iraq	  war,	  in	  part	  by	  suggesting	  (as	  President	  Bush	  in	  fact	  did)	  that	  there	  “was	  a	  risk,	  a	  real	  risk,	  that	  Saddam	  Hussein	  would	  pass	  weapons	  or	  materials	  or	  information	  to	  terrorist	  networks.”40	  After	  reading	  this	  article,	  they	  read	  about	  the	  Duelfer	  Report,	  which	  documented	  the	  lack	  of	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction	  in	  Iraq.	  Subjects	  were	  then	  asked	  to	  state	  their	  agreement,	  on	  a	  five-­‐point	  scale	  (from	  “strongly	  agree”	  to	  “strongly	  disagree”)	  with	  the	  statement	  that	  Iraq	  “had	  an	  active	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction	  program,	  the	  ability	  to	  produce	  these	  weapons,	  and	  large	  stockpiles	  of	  WMD.”41	  	  The	  effect	  of	  the	  correction	  greatly	  varied	  by	  political	  ideology.	  For	  very	  liberal	  subjects,	  there	  was	  a	  modest	  shift	  in	  favor	  of	  disagreement	  with	  this	  statement;	  the	  shift	  was	  not	  significant,	  because	  very	  liberal	  subjects	  already	  tended	  to	  disagree	  with	  it.42	  But	  for	  those	  who	  characterized	  themselves	  as	  conservative,	  there	  was	  a	  statistically	  significant	  shift	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  agreeing	  with	  the	  statement.	  “In	  other	  words,	  the	  correction	  backfired	  –	  conservatives	  who	  received	  a	  correction	  telling	  them	  that	  Iraq	  did	  not	  have	  WMD	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  believe	  that	  Iraq	  had	  WMD	  than	  those	  in	  the	  control	  condition.”43	  It	  follows	  that	  the	  correction	  had	  a	  polarizing	  effect;	  it	  divided	  people	  more	  sharply,	  on	  the	  issue	  at	  hand,	  than	  they	  had	  been	  divided	  before.	  	  An	  independent	  study	  confirmed	  the	  more	  general	  effect.	  People	  were	  asked	  to	  evaluate	  the	  proposition	  that	  cutting	  taxes	  is	  so	  effective	  in	  stimulating	  economic	  growth	  that	  it	  actually	  increases	  government	  revenue.	  They	  were	  then	  asked	  to	  read	  a	  correction.	  The	  correction	  actually	  increased	  people’s	  commitments	  to	  the	  proposition	  in	  question.	  “Conservatives	  presented	  with	  evidence	  that	  tax	  cuts	  do	  not	  increase	  government	  revenues	  ended	  up	  believing	  this	  claim	  more	  fervently	  than	  those	  who	  did	  not	  receive	  a	  correction.”44	  	  	  Or	  consider	  a	  test	  of	  whether	  apparently	  credible	  media	  corrections	  alter	  the	  belief,	  supported	  and	  pressed	  by	  former	  Alaska	  Governor	  Sarah	  Palin,	  that	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Brendan	  Nyhan	  &	  Jason	  Reifler,	  When	  Corrections	  Fail:	  The	  Persistence	  of	  Political	  
Misperceptions,	  32	  POL.	  BEHAV.	  303,	  312	  (2010).	  41	  Id.	  at	  312-­‐13.	  42	  Id.	  at	  314.	  43	  Id.	  at	  314-­‐15.	  44	  Id.	  at	  320.	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Affordable	  Care	  Act	  would	  create	  “death	  panels.”45	  Among	  those	  who	  viewed	  Palin	  favorably	  but	  had	  limited	  political	  knowledge,	  the	  correction	  succeeded;	  it	  also	  succeeded	  among	  those	  who	  views	  Palin	  unfavorably.46	  But	  the	  correction	  actually	  backfired	  among	  Palin	  supporters	  with	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  political	  knowledge.	  After	  receiving	  the	  correction,	  they	  became	  more	  likely	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  Affordable	  Care	  Act	  contained	  death	  panels.47	  	  Liberals	  (and	  Democrats)	  are	  hardly	  immune	  to	  this	  effect.	  In	  2005,	  many	  liberals	  wrongly	  believed	  that	  President	  George	  W.	  Bush	  had	  imposed	  a	  ban	  on	  stem	  cell	  research.48	  Presented	  with	  a	  correction	  from	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  or	  FoxNews.com,	  liberals	  generally	  continued	  to	  believe	  what	  they	  did	  before.49	  By	  contrast,	  conservatives	  accepted	  the	  correction.50	  Hence	  the	  correction	  produced	  an	  increase	  in	  polarization.	  	  	  As	  noted,	  the	  relevant	  experiments	  involve	  people	  with	  clear	  ideological	  (rather	  than	  partisan)	  convictions,	  and	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  no	  clear	  evidence	  on	  the	  specific	  question	  whether	  the	  same	  effects	  would	  be	  observed	  for	  party.	  But	  in	  light	  of	  the	  general	  evidence	  of	  partyism,	  there	  is	  every	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  they	  would.	  Indeed,	  an	  important	  and	  related	  study	  shows	  that	  people	  will	  follow	  the	  views	  of	  their	  party	  even	  when	  those	  views	  diverge	  from	  their	  independent	  judgments	  –	  and	  also	  that	  they	  are	  blind	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  party	  influence.51	  	  	  In	  the	  relevant	  study,	  people	  –	  both	  Democrats	  and	  Republicans	  -­‐-­‐	  were	  asked	  their	  views	  about	  an	  assortment	  of	  political	  issues.	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  was	  possible	  to	  obtain	  a	  sense	  of	  how	  members	  of	  both	  parties	  thought	  about	  those	  issues.	  Otherwise	  identical	  groups	  were	  then	  asked	  about	  the	  same	  issues,	  but	  with	  one	  difference:	  They	  were	  informed	  of	  the	  views	  of	  party	  leadership.	  The	  effect	  of	  that	  information	  was	  significant.	  Armed	  with	  that	  information,	  people	  departed	  from	  the	  views	  that	  they	  would	  have	  held	  if	  they	  had	  not	  been	  so	  armed.	  Stunningly,	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  information	  “overwhelmed	  the	  impact	  of	  both	  the	  policy’s	  objective	  impact	  and	  participants’	  ideological	  beliefs.”52	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  people	  were	  blind	  to	  that	  impact;	  they	  actually	  said	  that	  their	  judgments	  were	  based	  solely	  on	  the	  merits,	  not	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  learning	  about	  the	  beliefs	  of	  party	  leaders.	  Here,	  then,	  is	  clear	  evidence	  of	  the	  consequences	  of	  partyism	  for	  people’s	  judgments	  –	  and	  of	  people’s	  unawareness	  of	  that	  fact.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Brendan	  Nyhan,	  Jason	  Reifler	  &	  Peter	  A.	  Ubel,	  The	  Hazards	  of	  Correcting	  Myths	  
About	  Health	  Care	  Reform,	  51	  MED.	  CARE	  127,	  127	  (2013).	  46	  Id.	  at	  129-­‐30.	  47	  Id.	  48	  Id.	  49	  Nyhan	  &	  Reifler,	  supra	  note,	  at	  321.	  50	  Id.	  at	  321-­‐22.	  51	  See	  Geoffrey	  Cohen,	  Party	  Over	  Policy,	  85	  J	  Pers	  Soc	  Psychol.	  808	  (2003).	  52	  Id.	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B. Gridlock	  	  It	  might	  be	  expected	  that	  under	  circumstances	  of	  partyism,	  legislation	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  enact.	  If	  legislators	  themselves	  suffer	  from	  partyism,	  this	  conclusion	  should	  seem	  self-­‐evident.	  And	  even	  if	  they	  do	  not	  –	  even	  if	  they	  feel	  no	  antagonism	  to	  members	  of	  the	  opposing	  party,	  and	  are	  fully	  willing	  to	  work	  with	  them	  -­‐-­‐	  constituent	  pressures	  should	  push	  in	  this	  direction.	  In	  fact,	  recent	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  partyism	  has	  been	  contributing	  to	  a	  highly	  unusual	  degree	  of	  inactivity	  in	  Congress.	  	  1.	  Measures.	  During	  the	  year	  that	  Harry	  Truman	  complained	  of	  the	  "Do	  Nothing	  Congress,"	  511	  statutes	  were	  enacted	  (and	  that	  was	  only	  one	  year	  of	  a	  two-­‐year	  session).53	  As	  of	  this	  writing	  (December	  2014),	  the	  113th	  Congress	  is	  on	  pace	  to	  be	  the	  least	  productive	  since	  1973,	  at	  least	  if	  measured	  by	  the	  number	  of	  enacted	  statutes.54	  Thus	  far,	  186	  statutes	  have	  been	  enacted.55	  The	  previous	  Congress	  enacted	  the	  next	  fewest	  (281).56	  This	  dramatic	  decrease	  is	  not	  only	  a	  product	  of	  a	  reduction	  in	  purely	  ceremonial	  legislation:	  fewer	  substantive	  laws	  were	  enacted	  in	  the	  first	  nineteen	  months	  of	  the	  113th	  Congress	  than	  in	  any	  Congress	  of	  the	  preceding	  two	  decades.57	  	  It	  is	  true	  that	  a	  purely	  numerical	  measure	  will	  not	  be	  adequate,	  even	  if	  it	  is	  focused	  only	  on	  substantive	  statutes.	  A	  Congress	  might	  enact	  few	  laws,	  but	  those	  ‘	  that	  it	  enacts	  might	  be	  exceptionally	  important.	  By	  another	  and	  in	  some	  ways	  better	  measure,	  Congress	  also	  appears	  to	  have	  become	  unusually	  gridlocked.	  Sarah	  Binder	  assesses	  legislative	  gridlock	  by	  examining	  what	  proportion	  of	  the	  most	  salient	  legislative	  issues	  are	  acted	  on	  by	  Congress	  by	  the	  end	  of	  a	  congressional	  session.	  To	  assess	  issue	  salience,	  she	  investigated	  the	  number	  of	  appearances	  an	  issue	  makes	  in	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  unsigned	  editorials	  to	  assess	  issue	  salience.	  She	  finds	  that	  the	  112th	  Congress,	  in	  session	  from	  2011-­‐12,	  was	  the	  most	  gridlocked	  in	  the	  data	  set	  (tied	  only	  with	  1999-­‐2000),	  going	  back	  to	  1947.	  By	  her	  measure,	  more	  than	  70	  percent	  of	  all	  salient	  issues	  were	  gridlocked	  in	  that	  Congress,	  compared	  to	  fewer	  than	  30	  percent	  in	  1947.58	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  Matt	  Viser,	  This	  Congress	  Going	  Down	  As	  Least	  Productive,	  Boston	  Globe,	  Dec.	  4,	  2013,	  available	  at	  http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2013/12/04/congress-­‐course-­‐make-­‐history-­‐least-­‐productive/kGAVEBskUeqCB0htOUG9GI/story.html	  54	  Bills	  by	  Final	  Status,	  govtrack.us,	  https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/statistics	  (last	  visited	  Dec.	  1,	  2014).	  	  55	  Id.	  56	  Id.	  57	  Drew	  Desilver,	  Congress	  Continues	  Its	  Streak	  of	  Passing	  Few	  Significant	  Laws,	  July	  31,	  2014,	  http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-­‐tank/2014/07/31/congress-­‐continues-­‐its-­‐streak-­‐of-­‐passing-­‐few-­‐significant-­‐laws/.	  58	  SARAH	  BINDER,	  CTR.	  FOR	  EFFECTIVE	  PUB.	  MGMT.	  AT	  BROOKINGS,	  POLARIZED	  WE	  GOVERN?	  9-­‐10	  (2014),	  available	  at	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  2.	  Is	  gridlock	  bad?	  There	  is	  of	  course	  a	  legitimate	  question	  whether	  gridlock	  is	  good	  or	  bad.	  If	  an	  active	  Congress	  would	  reduce	  social	  welfare,	  there	  would	  be	  a	  good	  argument	  for	  an	  inactive	  Congress.	  Social	  welfare	  is	  the	  guide,	  not	  the	  volume	  of	  activity.	  A	  blocked	  national	  legislature	  is	  something	  to	  lament	  only	  if	  the	  result,	  all	  things	  considered,	  is	  to	  diminish	  social	  welfare.	  One	  issue	  is	  whether	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  legislative	  status	  quo	  is	  wanting;	  if	  it	  is	  not,	  new	  enactments	  are	  not	  so	  desirable.	  Another	  issue	  is	  whether	  new	  enactments	  would	  be	  improvements;	  if	  they	  would	  not	  be,	  then	  gridlock	  is	  a	  blessing,	  not	  a	  curse.	  	  A	  full	  account	  of	  any	  particular	  state	  of	  affairs	  would	  require	  a	  theory	  of	  optimal	  deadlock.	  This	  is	  not	  the	  place	  for	  any	  such	  theory.	  But	  it	  seems	  reasonable	  to	  think	  that	  if	  a	  nation	  faces	  a	  range	  of	  serious	  problems,	  if	  imaginable	  initiatives	  would	  reduce	  or	  solve	  those	  problems,	  and	  if	  partyism	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  undertake	  those	  initiatives,	  then	  something	  is	  badly	  amiss.	  Under	  imaginable	  assumptions,	  all	  of	  those	  assumptions	  are	  eminently	  reasonable.	  	  
IV.	  Solutions	  
	   My	  principal	  goal	  here	  has	  been	  positive	  rather	  than	  normative.	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  believe	  that	  partyism	  is	  growing	  and	  real	  but	  that	  nothing	  should	  be	  done	  about	  it.	  But	  the	  increase	  in	  partyism	  has	  produced	  serious	  problems	  for	  American	  government.	  How	  might	  institutions	  respond?	  	  	  It	  is	  tempting	  to	  urge	  that	  we	  should	  aim	  at	  its	  causes,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  we	  are	  able	  to	  identify	  them.	  That	  would	  certainly	  be	  most	  direct	  and	  ambitious	  response.	  But	  James	  Madison’s	  words	  of	  the	  Federalist	  No.	  10,	  applied	  to	  the	  related	  phenomenon	  of	  faction,	  are	  highly	  relevant	  here:	  “Liberty	  is	  to	  faction	  what	  air	  is	  to	  fire,	  an	  aliment	  without	  which	  it	  instantly	  expires.	  But	  it	  could	  not	  be	  less	  folly	  to	  abolish	  liberty,	  which	  is	  essential	  to	  political	  life,	  because	  it	  nourishes	  faction,	  than	  it	  would	  be	  to	  wish	  the	  annihilation	  of	  air,	  which	  is	  essential	  to	  animal	  life,	  because	  it	  imparts	  to	  fire	  its	  destructive	  agency.”59	  	  	  With	  Madison’s	  caution	  in	  mind,	  we	  should	  acknowledge	  that	  it	  would	  be	  folly	  to	  attempt	  to	  abolish	  partyism.	  To	  be	  sure,	  the	  nature	  and	  degree	  of	  partyism	  are	  not	  static.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  partyism	  has	  increased	  significantly	  in	  recent	  decades,	  and	  it	  might	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  much	  lower	  in	  2035	  than	  it	  is	  2015.	  But	  changes	  of	  that	  kind	  cannot	  easily	  be	  engineered.	  They	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  a	  function	  of	  an	  array	  of	  social	  forces,	  including	  emerging	  technologies,	  invisible-­‐hand	  mechanisms,	  and	  the	  decentralized	  decisions	  of	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  private	  and	  public	  actors.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/05/27%20polarized%20we%20govern%20binder/brookingscepm_polarized_figreplacedtextrevtablerev.pdf.	  Data	  on	  the	  113th	  Congress	  was	  not	  available	  when	  this	  study	  was	  published.	  59	  See	  The	  Federalist	  No.	  10.	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  The	  real	  solutions	  lie	  not	  in	  aiming	  at	  the	  causes	  of	  partyism	  but	  in	  working	  to	  counteract	  its	  effects.	  	  Consider	  three	  possibilities.	  	  
A. Timing	  Is	  Everything	  	  For	  obvious	  reasons.	  partyism	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  most	  intense	  before	  a	  presidential	  or	  mid-­‐term	  election.	  At	  that	  point,	  negative	  campaigning	  will	  be	  heightened,	  and	  politicians	  might	  well	  be	  at	  risk	  if	  they	  attempt	  to	  make	  common	  cause	  with	  those	  from	  the	  opposing	  party.	  By	  contrast,	  partyism	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  reduced	  in	  the	  immediate	  aftermath	  of	  a	  presidential	  campaign,	  when	  the	  newly	  elected	  Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief	  enjoys	  a	  “honeymoon	  period.”	  The	  term	  is	  a	  good	  one,	  because	  it	  captures	  a	  central	  feature	  of	  the	  immediate	  aftermath	  of	  an	  election,	  which	  is	  that	  a	  new	  relationship	  is	  created	  with	  a	  kind	  of	  warm	  glow.	  In	  the	  presence	  of	  that	  glow,	  partyism	  is	  diminished,	  at	  least	  for	  a	  time,	  and	  it	  may	  be	  possible	  to	  accomplish	  a	  great	  deal.	  	  The	  point	  suggests	  the	  immense	  importance	  of	  the	  period	  of	  presidential	  transition,	  and	  the	  need	  for	  a	  president-­‐elect	  to	  focus	  carefully	  on	  the	  top	  priorities	  of	  her	  or	  his	  first	  term.	  Clear	  identification	  of	  those	  priorities,	  alongside	  a	  strategy	  for	  bringing	  them	  to	  fruition,	  had	  long	  been	  exceedingly	  important.	  But	  under	  conditions	  of	  partyism,	  it	  is	  essential	  to	  any	  president-­‐elect,	  and	  potentially	  to	  the	  nation	  as	  a	  while.	  	  
B.	  Precommitment	  Strategies	  	   Under	  creatively	  designed	  laws,	  significant	  reform	  can	  happen	  as	  a	  result	  of	  congressional	  inaction.	  Consider,	  for	  example,	  the	  Defense	  Base	  Realignment	  and	  Closure	  Act	  of	  1990,60	  which	  enables	  the	  president	  to	  appoint	  the	  nine	  members	  of	  a	  base-­‐closing	  commission.	  The	  commission	  produces	  a	  list	  of	  recommended	  military-­‐base	  closures,	  and	  if	  the	  president	  approves,	  they	  happen	  —	  unless	  Congress	  enacts	  a	  resolution	  of	  disapproval	  within	  45	  days.	  If	  Congress	  does	  nothing,	  the	  closures	  go	  into	  effect.	  	  A	  more	  controversial	  example	  is	  known	  as	  “the	  sequester.”61	  In	  2011,	  Congress	  and	  President	  Obama	  completed	  a	  difficult	  negotiation	  by	  agreeing	  that	  unless	  Congress	  enacted	  new	  legislation,	  automatic	  (and	  aggressive)	  spending	  cuts	  would	  go	  into	  effect	  in	  2013.62	  At	  the	  time,	  few	  people	  favored	  the	  automatic	  cuts;	  they	  saw	  them	  as	  a	  mechanism	  to	  force	  Congress	  to	  do	  its	  job.	  But	  the	  sequester	  did	  go	  into	  effect,	  and	  for	  better	  or	  worse,	  it	  has	  had	  major	  effects	  on	  federal	  spending.	  The	  power	  of	  the	  2011	  decision	  was	  that	  it	  established	  a	  drastic	  outcome	  if	  Congress	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  Public	  Law	  101-­‐510.	  61	  The	  Budget	  Control	  Act	  of	  2011	  (Pub.L.	  112–25,	  S.	  365,	  125	  Stat.	  240,	  enacted	  August	  2,	  2011).	  62	  Id.	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failed	  to	  act.	  The	  noteworthy	  surprise	  was	  that	  as	  a	  result	  of	  partyism,	  the	  default	  outcome	  actually	  went	  into	  effect.	  	  If	  the	  goal	  is	  to	  reform	  Social	  Security,	  to	  make	  significant	  changes	  in	  fiscal	  policy,	  or	  to	  achieve	  any	  other	  large-­‐scale	  goal,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  imagine	  a	  strategy	  of	  this	  kind:	  With	  or	  without	  the	  help	  of	  a	  commission,	  Congress	  could	  allow	  specified	  reforms	  to	  occur	  on	  a	  specified	  date	  unless	  a	  future	  Congress	  says	  otherwise.	  Of	  course	  there	  is	  a	  serious	  challenge	  to	  efforts	  of	  this	  kind:	  Solutions	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  partyism	  might	  be	  defeated	  by	  partyism.	  But	  in	  some	  cases,	  some	  kind	  of	  precommitment	  strategy,	  or	  an	  alteration	  of	  the	  status	  quo,	  has	  sufficient	  appeal	  to	  be	  feasible.	  	  
C. Delegation	  and	  Technocracy	  	  In	  many	  cases,	  the	  best	  response	  to	  partyism	  lies	  in	  delegation,	  and	  in	  particular	  in	  strengthening	  the	  hand	  of	  technocratic	  forces	  within	  government.	  The	  basic	  idea	  is	  that	  the	  resolution	  of	  many	  political	  questions	  should	  not	  turn	  on	  politics,	  at	  least	  not	  in	  any	  simple	  or	  crude	  sense.	  Partyism	  is	  unhelpful,	  because	  partisan	  differences	  are	  irrelevant	  or	  nearly	  so.	  Consider	  these	  problems:	  	  1. Should	  EPA	  reduce	  the	  permissible	  level	  of	  ozone	  in	  the	  ambient	  air	  from	  75	  parts	  per	  billion	  (ppb)	  to	  70	  ppb,	  65	  ppb,	  or	  60	  pbb?	  2. Should	  OSHA	  issue	  a	  new	  rule	  to	  control	  exposure	  to	  silica	  in	  the	  construction	  industry?	  3. Should	  the	  Department	  of	  Transportation	  require	  rearview	  cameras	  to	  be	  installed	  in	  new	  automobiles?	  4. Should	  the	  Food	  and	  Drug	  Administration	  (FDA)	  ban	  asthma	  inhalers	  that	  emit	  CFCs?	  	   All	  of	  these	  questions	  are	  highly	  technical.	  They	  cannot	  possibly	  be	  answered	  without	  careful	  engagement	  with	  empirical	  issues.	  Policymakers	  need	  to	  know	  the	  benefits	  of	  imaginable	  policies	  in	  terms	  of	  health	  and	  safety.	  They	  also	  need	  to	  know	  the	  costs,	  monetary	  and	  otherwise.	  Would	  a	  new	  rule	  for	  silica	  cost	  $100	  million,	  or	  $500	  million,	  or	  $1	  billion?	  What	  would	  be	  the	  consequences	  of	  those	  costs?	  Would	  they	  result	  in	  fewer	  jobs	  or	  in	  reduced	  wages?	  What	  are	  the	  actual	  harms	  associated	  with	  exposure	  to	  silica	  at	  various	  lives?	  With	  proposed	  regulations,	  how	  many	  lives	  would	  be	  saved?	  	  To	  be	  sure,	  judgments	  of	  value	  may	  play	  a	  role	  in	  controversies	  of	  this	  kind,	  but	  with	  imaginable	  empirical	  projections,	  there	  may	  be	  sufficient	  consensus	  to	  ensure	  agreement	  on	  particular	  outcomes,	  even	  amidst	  significant	  differences	  in	  value	  and	  across	  party	  lines.	  If,	  for	  example,	  a	  silica	  regulation	  would	  cost	  $1	  billion	  and	  save	  merely	  two	  lives	  per	  year,	  few	  people	  would	  support	  it,	  whatever	  their	  party	  affiliation.	  And	  if	  it	  would	  cost	  $100	  million	  and	  save	  700	  lives	  per	  year,	  few	  people	  would	  reject	  it.	  In	  any	  event,	  it	  is	  hopeless	  to	  try	  to	  answer	  many	  of	  the	  central	  questions	  by	  reference	  to	  one’s	  party	  identification.	  	  
	   16	  
	  No	  one	  denies	  that	  Republicans	  and	  Democratic	  have	  different	  attitudes	  toward	  the	  Environmental	  Protection	  Agency	  and	  the	  Occupational	  Safety	  and	  Health	  Administration,	  and	  those	  different	  attitudes	  might	  well	  lead	  to	  disagreements	  about	  particular	  initiatives.	  What	  I	  am	  urging	  here	  is	  that	  many	  disagreements	  are	  not	  really	  about	  values	  or	  partisan	  commitments,	  but	  about	  facts,	  and	  when	  facts	  are	  sufficiently	  engaged,	  disagreements	  across	  party	  lines	  will	  often	  melt	  away.	  	  In	  these	  circumstances,	  broad	  delegations	  to	  the	  executive	  branch	  make	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  sense,	  at	  least	  (and	  this	  is	  an	  important	  proviso)	  if	  officials	  within	  that	  branch	  
can	  be	  trusted	  to	  make	  decisions	  with	  careful	  reference	  to	  the	  facts.	  In	  my	  view,	  institutional	  characteristics	  of	  the	  executive	  branch	  justify	  a	  degree	  of	  trust,	  at	  least	  as	  a	  general	  rule.	  The	  reason	  is	  that	  the	  executive	  branch	  –	  again	  as	  a	  general	  rule	  –	  tends	  both	  to	  have	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  technical	  expertise	  and	  to	  treat	  technical	  issues	  as	  they	  should	  be	  treated.	  Ironically,	  it	  has	  a	  degree	  of	  insulation	  from	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  politics,	  enabling	  it	  to	  focus	  on	  questions	  as	  specialists	  do.63	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  this	  is	  so,	  there	  are	  significant	  advantages	  in	  allowing	  the	  specialists	  to	  do	  their	  work,	  subject	  of	  course	  to	  ultimate	  legislative	  control,	  but	  not	  to	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  conflicts	  made	  inevitable	  by	  partyism.	  	  If	  this	  is	  so,	  then	  partyism	  provides	  yet	  another	  reason	  to	  embrace	  the	  time-­‐honored	  idea	  that	  agencies	  should	  be	  allowed	  to	  interpret	  ambiguous	  statutory	  terms	  as	  they	  see	  fit,	  so	  long	  as	  their	  interpretations	  are	  reasonable.64	  Indeed,	  we	  might	  be	  prepared	  to	  go	  somewhat	  further.	  Some	  statutes	  –	  like	  some	  constitutional	  provisions	  –	  endure	  for	  long	  periods	  of	  time,	  and	  must	  be	  construed	  across	  significant	  changes	  in	  both	  facts	  and	  values.	  Of	  course	  the	  executive	  branch	  must	  respect	  the	  law	  as	  Congress	  has	  enacted	  it.	  But	  common	  law	  courts	  have	  long	  had	  the	  authority	  to	  adapt	  statutory	  terms	  to	  new	  or	  unanticipated	  circumstances,	  even	  when	  the	  interpretation	  fits	  awkwardly	  with	  the	  apparent	  meaning	  of	  the	  text.65	  Under	  circumstances	  of	  partyism,	  it	  is	  plausible	  to	  think	  that	  agencies	  should	  have	  the	  same	  power	  –	  and	  perhaps	  a	  bit	  more	  so.66	  The	  reason	  is	  that	  a	  well-­‐functioning	  nation	  requires	  adjustments	  across	  time,	  and	  agencies	  are	  often	  in	  the	  best	  position	  to	  make	  those	  adjustments.	  	  Do	  the	  same	  arguments	  apply	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  foreign	  affairs?	  That	  question	  raises	  many	  problems,	  and	  	  full	  argument	  would	  require	  a	  far	  more	  detailed	  treatment	  than	  I	  am	  able	  to	  provide	  here.67	  But	  here	  as	  well,	  the	  executive	  branch	  has	  important	  informational	  advantages,	  and	  at	  least	  under	  circumstances	  of	  severe	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  See	  Cass	  R.	  Sunstein,	  Valuing	  Life	  (2014).	  64	  See	  Chevron	  v.	  NRDC	  .	  467	  U.S.	  837	  (1984).	  65	  See	  Church	  of	  the	  Holy	  Trinity	  v.	  US,	  143	  US	  457	  (1892);	  Riggs	  v.	  Palmer,	  115	  N.Y.	  506	  (1889).	  66	  For	  possible	  support,	  see	  Entergy	  v.	  Riverkeeper,	  556	  US	  208	  (2009).	  67	  For	  relevant	  discussion,	  see	  Eric	  A.	  Posner	  and	  Cass	  R.	  Sunstein,	  Chevronizing	  Foreign	  Relations	  Law,	  116	  Yale	  LJ	  1170	  (2007).	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partyism,	  mandatory	  resort	  to	  Congress	  could	  prevent	  highly	  desirable	  action.	  When	  circumstances	  change	  in	  the	  world,	  action	  by	  the	  United	  States	  might	  have	  to	  change	  as	  well,	  and	  if	  legislative	  authorization	  is	  invariably	  required,	  desirable	  action	  might	  be	  prevented,	  at	  least	  under	  conditions	  of	  partyism.	  	  	  These	  points	  should	  not	  be	  misunderstood.	  I	  am	  not	  suggesting	  that	  the	  President	  can	  make	  war	  on	  his	  own,	  violate	  constitutional	  restrictions	  on	  his	  authority,	  disregard	  legal	  requirements,	  or	  otherwise	  abandon	  the	  constitutional	  plan.	  But	  Congress	  itself	  has	  to	  make	  decisions	  –	  for	  example,	  in	  generating	  the	  text	  of	  an	  authorization	  for	  the	  use	  of	  military	  force	  (AUMF)	  –	  and	  where	  threats	  to	  national	  security	  are	  real,	  there	  are	  good	  arguments	  for	  a	  degree	  of	  breadth	  and	  flexibility	  rather	  than	  narrowness	  and	  constraint.	  And	  where	  the	  text	  of	  an	  AUMF	  is	  ambiguous,	  there	  are	  good	  arguments	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  view	  that	  just	  as	  in	  the	  domestic	  sphere,	  the	  President	  should	  have	  some	  scope	  for	  interpreting	  that	  text	  as	  he	  sees	  fit.68	  	  	  Of	  course	  it	  is	  true	  that	  this	  argument	  will	  have	  little	  appeal	  to	  those	  who	  believe	  that	  the	  executive	  branch	  itself	  suffers	  from	  serious	  institutional	  biases,	  or	  who	  think	  that	  it	  is	  important	  to	  impose	  sharp	  discipline	  on	  the	  discretion	  of	  the	  executive	  branch.	  And	  it	  must	  be	  emphasized	  that	  I	  am	  not	  arguing	  for	  a	  radical	  idea,	  or	  	  dramatic	  departure	  from	  the	  status	  quo.	  No	  one	  contends	  that	  Congress	  should	  give	  genuinely	  blank	  checks	  to	  the	  executive.	  The	  argument	  is	  only	  that	  in	  an	  era	  of	  partyism,	  there	  is	  increased	  reason	  for	  allowing	  a	  degree	  of	  discretion	  –	  and	  for	  judicial	  receptivity	  to	  agency	  decisions	  in	  the	  face	  of	  genuine	  ambiguity.	  	  
D. A	  Note	  on	  the	  Fragility	  of	  Institutional	  Judgments	  	  While	  the	  main	  goal	  here	  has	  been	  positive	  rather	  than	  normative,	  we	  have	  seen	  that	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  partyism	  fortifies	  the	  case	  for	  certain	  forms	  of	  executive	  action,	  and	  for	  receptivity	  to	  a	  degree	  of	  discretion	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  executive	  branch.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  acknowledge,	  however,	  that	  in	  practice,	  people’s	  judgments	  about	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  executive	  are	  greatly	  and	  even	  decisively	  affected	  by	  their	  approval	  or	  disapproval	  of	  the	  incumbent	  president.	  Under	  a	  Republican	  president,	  Democrats	  do	  not	  approve	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  discretion-­‐wielding	  chief	  executive,	  enabled	  by	  deferential	  courts.	  Under	  a	  Democratic	  president,	  Republicans	  tend	  to	  have,	  and	  even	  to	  voice,	  the	  same	  cautions	  and	  concerns.	  During	  the	  George	  W.	  Bush	  Administration,	  it	  was	  common	  for	  Democrats	  to	  object	  to	  an	  overreaching	  executive	  and	  to	  argue	  for	  regular	  resort	  to	  the	  national	  legislation.	  During	  the	  Obama	  Administration,	  Democrats	  have	  rarely	  taken	  such	  positions,	  and	  Republicans	  have	  made	  arguments	  against	  executive	  discretion	  that	  they	  eschewed	  under	  Republican	  leadership.	  	  In	  this	  respect,	  some	  of	  the	  most	  important	  institutional	  judgments	  are	  fragile	  and	  even	  unstable.	  They	  are	  weakly	  held	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  preditably	  “flip”	  with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  See	  Posner	  and	  Sunstein,	  supra	  note.	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changes	  in	  the	  allocation	  of	  political	  power.	  We	  could	  even	  see	  institutional	  judgments	  as	  victims	  of	  partyism	  itself.	  Questions	  of	  institutional	  authority	  are,	  in	  a	  sense,	  overwhelmed	  by	  short-­‐term	  assessments	  of	  the	  particular	  people	  who	  are	  currently	  occupying	  relevant	  offices.	  For	  this	  reason,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  evaluations	  of	  arguments	  in	  favor	  a	  receptive	  approach	  to	  presidential	  power	  in	  light	  of	  partyism	  will	  be	  dominated	  by	  one	  factor:	  evaluation	  of	  the	  current	  occupant	  of	  the	  Oval	  Office.	  	  The	  aspiration,	  of	  course,	  is	  that	  institutional	  claims	  can	  be	  evaluated	  behind	  a	  kind	  of	  veil	  of	  ignorance,	  and	  that	  short-­‐term	  considerations	  about	  the	  immediate	  winners	  and	  losers	  might	  be	  put	  to	  one	  side.	  For	  political	  actors,	  of	  course,	  adoption	  of	  a	  veil	  of	  ignorance	  is	  extremely	  challenging,	  between	  short-­‐term	  electoral	  considerations	  often	  argue	  against	  it.	  If,	  for	  example,	  a	  Republican	  politician	  argues	  for	  acceptance	  of	  presidential	  discretion	  when	  the	  President	  is	  a	  Democrat,	  she	  might	  seriously	  endanger	  her	  political	  prospects.	  Even	  for	  observers,	  the	  challenge	  is	  also	  real,	  because	  short-­‐term	  political	  considerations	  have	  such	  salience.	  My	  hope	  is	  that	  the	  standard	  claims	  on	  behalf	  of	  executive	  authority	  –	  strengthened	  in	  the	  face	  of	  partyism	  –	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  rest	  on	  assumptions	  that	  while	  hardly	  irresistible,	  are	  plausible	  enough,	  both	  now	  and	  for	  the	  foreseeable	  future.	  	  	   	  
Conclusion	  	  Partyism	  is	  real,	  and	  it	  is	  increasing,	  and	  it	  has	  serious	  adverse	  effects	  both	  in	  daily	  life	  and	  in	  the	  political	  domain.	  It	  makes	  governance	  more	  difficult	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  even	  impossible.	  Even	  when	  legislators	  are	  aware	  that	  a	  bipartisan	  agreement	  would	  be	  sensible,	  they	  might	  well	  be	  under	  severe	  electoral	  pressure	  not	  to	  enter	  into	  it,	  because	  they	  might	  face	  some	  kind	  of	  reprisal	  from	  constituents	  or	  colleagues.	  	  	  Even	  under	  current	  conditions,	  the	  effects	  of	  partyism	  have	  been	  far	  serious	  in	  some	  periods	  than	  in	  others.	  On	  the	  eve	  of	  a	  midterm	  election,	  for	  example,	  those	  effects	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  heightened.	  In	  the	  six	  months	  after	  a	  presidential	  election,	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  reduced.	  But	  for	  structural	  reasons,	  large-­‐scale	  reductions	  in	  partyism	  are	  unlikely,	  certainly	  in	  the	  short-­‐term.	  	  Is	  this	  a	  problem?	  If	  the	  statutory	  status	  quo	  is	  pretty	  good,	  and	  if	  further	  action	  from	  the	  national	  government	  would	  likely	  make	  things	  worse,	  then	  there	  would	  little	  reason	  to	  lament	  the	  existence	  of	  partyism.	  In	  such	  circumstances,	  partyism	  might	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  a	  valuable	  safeguard.	  But	  if	  a	  nation	  faces	  serious	  problems,	  and	  if	  imaginable	  initiatives	  would	  helpfully	  address	  them,	  then	  partyism	  might	  turn	  out	  to	  create	  significant	  dangers	  for	  both	  peace	  and	  prosperity.	  	  	  At	  least	  in	  the	  immediate	  future,	  it	  seems	  unlikely	  that	  the	  United	  States	  will	  be	  able	  to	  make	  significant	  progress	  in	  reducing	  the	  causes	  of	  partyism.	  If	  such	  reductions	  are	  to	  occur,	  it	  will	  probably	  be	  a	  product	  of	  spontaneous	  forces	  rather	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than	  of	  any	  kind	  of	  self-­‐conscious	  design.	  The	  best	  hope	  lies	  in	  reducing	  partyism’s	  effects.	  I	  have	  suggested	  that	  the	  most	  promising	  approach	  lies	  in	  relatively	  broad	  delegations	  of	  authority,	  emphasizing	  technocratic	  expertise,	  and	  in	  a	  receptive	  approach	  to	  the	  Chevron	  principle,	  allowing	  adaptations	  (not	  violations)	  of	  statutory	  text	  to	  changing	  values	  and	  circumstances.	  	  	  	  	  
